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To preserve the Bitcoin ledger’s integrity, a node that joins
the system must download a full copy of the entire Bitcoin
blockchain if it wants to verify newly created blocks.
At the time of writing, the blockchain weights 79 GiB and
takes hours of processing on high-end machines. Owners of
low-resource devices (known as thin nodes), such as smart-
phones, avoid that cost by either opting for minimum veri-
fication or by depending on full nodes, which weakens their
security model.
In this work, we propose to harden the security model of
thin nodes by enabling them to verify blocks in an adaptive
manner, with regards to the level of targeted confidence,
with low storage requirements and a short bootstrap time.
Our approach exploits sharding within a distributed hash
table (DHT) to distribute the storage load, and a few addi-
tional hashes to prevent attacks on this new system.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
D.4.7 [Organization and Design]: Distributed systems;
E.1 [Data structures]: Distributed data structures
Keywords
Blockchain, Bitcoin, Sharding, Distributed hash table
1. BACKGROUND
Introduced in 2008, Bitcoin [11] has emerged as the first
widely-deployed decentralized global cryptocurrency. It has
triggered the creation of numerous similar projects, such as
Ethereum [16], or Namecoin [5]. The current market capital-
ization of Bitcoin surpasses 9 billion USD1 and a significant
fraction of it is used in the overall 200,000 daily transactions.
Bitcoin is fully decentralized and requires no central bank
1https://bitinfocharts.com, 2016-09-01
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Figure 1: A new transaction (1), is advertised to
miners (2), who verify its integrity and insert it into
a block by solving a cryto-puzzle (3). This block (4)
(which forms a chain with the previous blocks, not
shown) is then broadcast to the rest of the network
(5) which in turn verifies its integrity to publicly
acknowledge the transaction between Bob and Alice.
or authority. It relies solely on the distributed maintenance
of a data structure called blockchain.
The blockchain is the core data structure introduced by
Bitcoin to prevent the acceptance of fraudulent transac-
tions. It essentially constitutes a distributed ledger which
stores an ever growing list of transactions in a secure man-
ner. All transactions stored in the blockchain are considered
immutable and valid.
Because of its immutability, a blockchain can be abstracted
as a transactional system that enables a consensus to form
within its participants. This consensus holds unique proba-
bilistic properties and can thus be leveraged as a basic build-
ing block for adaptive middlewares that offer both determin-
istic and probabilistic consensus.
As its name suggests, a blockchain is a sequence of blocks.
Each block contains a number of transactions, as well as a
cryptographic hash of the previous block, which links the
two blocks and effectively form a chain. Each transaction,
in turn, contains a set of inputs, i.e., the coins the payer
spends (for instance three coins of 3, 3, and 4 BTC belonging
to Alice in Figure 1, Step 1), and a set of outputs, i.e., the
coins delivered to the payee(s) (8 BTC delivered to Bob,
































































Figure 2: Both the blockchain and the UTxO set
have almost quadrupled in size in the past two years.
represents an arbitrary amount of money, measured at a
granularity of 10−8 BTC (an amount known as 1 satoshi).
A coin is generated through a transaction, is immutable for
its entire lifespan, and can only be spent once.
To mine (i.e., create) a block containing several trans-
actions (Step 2), a node has to solve a cryto-puzzle called
Proof-of-Work (PoW) (Step 3). Nodes who actively try to
solve this puzzle are called miners. The difficulty of solving
the PoW is automatically adjusted every two weeks, so that
a block is generated on average every 10 minutes. The newly
mined block (Step 4) is then propagated to the rest of the
network (Step 5), who can check its validity. A consensus
rule is instated to resolve forks and discard blocks that are
not part of the chain with the most work. This rule ensures
that miners converge in practice to a unique valid view of the
blockchain that prevents history rewrites and double spend-
ing of coins. The difficulty to create a block, combined with
this consensus rule, provides immutable valid transactions.
Before a miner inserts a transaction into a block (Step 2),
it checks the transaction’s validity. Once a transaction has
been added to the blockchain, all its inputs are considered
spent, and only its outputs are spendable. A transaction is
filed as valid if all its inputs exist as outputs of past trans-
actions in the blockchain and have not yet been spent. To
speed up this verification process, nodes keep track of un-
spent coins (and hence spendable) in a local data structure
known as the set of Unspent Transaction Output (UTxO).
In addition to miners, two more types of nodes are in-
volved in the Bitcoin ecosystem: full nodes and legacy thin
nodes2. Both types of nodes implement Bitcoin wallets,
storing a user’s cryptographic credentials and owned coins,
compiling transactions when the user makes a payment, and
checking the validity of transactions when the user receives
a payment. The sole difference between full and legacy thin
nodes is that full nodes pay the full price for being able to
locally verify transactions’ validity, while legacy thin nodes
outsource that verification to the former, effectively trading
their level of trust for lower resource expenditure.
2What is usually called a thin node in the current Bitcoin
system, or specifically a Simple Payment Verification (SPV)
client, is denoted legacy thin nodes in this paper to have a
clear distinction with the secure thin nodes we propose.
The price full nodes have to pay in terms of resources is in-
deed high. A full node joining the network has to download
the entire blockchain (427 K blocks, 79 GiB)3 and parse it se-
quentially to build the UTxO set (41.4 M coins, 1.39 GiB)4
from scratch. This simple process consumes excessive band-
width, computational resources and time, while it is not
scalable with respect to storage requirements. Figure 2 il-
lustrates the rapid growth of the sizes of both the blockchain
and the UTxO set between January 2009 and August 2016,
and demonstrates the need to lower the bandwidth and stor-
age requirements for resource-constrained devices.
Legacy thin nodes, on the other hand, avoid these resource
costs entirely by skipping the task of storing the blockchain
and the UTxO set. As a consequence, however, they are in-
capable of validating their transactions locally, having to rely
on full nodes for outsourced validation. Clearly, this dimin-
ishes the level of security experienced by legacy thin nodes.
In perspective, this constitutes a severe shortcoming of the
current Bitcoin design, as the massive spread and enormous
convenience of smartphones suggest that thin nodes will out-
number their full node counterparts by far, once the wider
population embraces digital currency. Even worse, in the
longer term it will severely undermine the overall public ac-
ceptance of the Bitcoin system.
Our work focuses precisely on the aforementioned gap in
Bitcoin’s design. More specifically, we propose an architec-
ture that targets legacy thin nodes, and enables them to val-
idate their transactions locally, without having to store the
blockchain or the UTxO set. This essentially raises legacy
thin nodes’ trust level close to that of full nodes, without
requiring prohibitive amounts of resources.
We present a coarse-grained view of our envisioned solu-
tion in Section 2 and its details in Section 3. We further
elaborate on the benefits our solution has to offer in Sec-
tion 4, while we present related work in Section 5. Finally,
we conclude this paper in Section 6.
2. ARCHITECTURE OVERVIEW
Our ultimate goal is to raise legacy thin nodes’ trust level
close to that of full nodes, by letting them verify their trans-
actions locally, without the need to arbitrarily trust other
nodes. As thin nodes are not expected to keep track of the
UTxO set, our solution focuses on providing them with the
alternative option of acquiring the UTxO set when needed.
We go in fact one step further by allowing thin nodes
to only acquire the specific part(s) of the UTxO set that
is required to validate one or more input coins. Thin nodes
that can validate input coins are called secure thin nodes. In
line with our goal of making Bitcoin practically accessible to
smartphones and resource-constrained devices, it would be
unrealistic to expect such devices to download a UTxO set
as large as 1.39 GiB in compressed form. Especially since
the UTxO set will likely continue its rapid growth.
Our intuition is as follows: we split the UTxO set into
shards that we store within a distributed hash table (DHT)
that secure thin nodes can query whenever they need to
validate the inputs of a transaction. To realize this intuition
in practice, two problems need to be addressed: first, the
3Blockchain size dataset as of 2016-09-01:
https://blockchain.info/charts/blocks-size.
4UTxO size dataset as of 2016-09-01: https://statoshi.info/
dashboard/db/unspent-transaction-output-set.
shards should ideally be of uniform size to ensure the DHT is
well-balanced; and second, appropriate care should be taken
to guarantee the integrity of the shards against malicious
nodes. To address the first problem, we partition the UTxO
set into 2k shards, S0, S1, . . . , Sk−1 by using the first k
bits of the coin’s hash to determine which shard the coin
should be allocated to. To address the second problem, we
then compute the SHA-2562 hashes of the shards, H0, H1,
. . . , Hk−1, which we compute after having sorted the coins
within each shard. Finally, we produce a SHA-2562 hash of
all shard hashes, which we call the UTxO hash, HUTxO. We
then include the 32-byte long UTxO hash in the block of the
official Bitcoin blockchain.
When a secure thin node wants to validate an input of an
incoming transaction, it hashes it, and fetches from the DHT
the UTxO shard indexed by the first k bits of the hash. It
then simply checks that this input is contained in this shard.
The crucial point is the way a secure thin node validates
the legitimacy of a shard it fetches. To do so, it also fetches
the entire list of shard hashes, H0, H1, . . . , Hk−1, and veri-
fies the hash of that list against the HUTxO value stored in
the blockchain. Once it has validated the list of hashes, it
can use the hashes in this list to verify the integrity of the
shard(s) it queries.
The last missing piece of the puzzle is the way secure thin
nodes get hold of the HUTxO from the blockchain. Nodes
download at some point the current block from a “trusted”
source, and thereafter keep receiving subsequently generated
blocks. This way, their confidence in the received HUTxO is
the same as their confidence in the blockchain itself.
Starting to follow the blockchain at some arbitrary start-
ing block rather than at the “genesis block” makes a secure
thin node’s trust model weaker than that of a full node.
However, if a newly joined secure thin node waits for a
number of blocks to be generated, checks that they are all
valid, that they adhere to the proof-or-work difficulty, and
that they are correctly timestamped, it has an extremely
strong indication that it is indeed following the legitimate
blockchain, as it would have been practically impossible for
a set of malicious nodes to generate several blocks of the
right difficulty. For added confidence, a newly joined node
may also make a trivial transaction (e.g., transfer 1 satoshi
to itself), wait to see it in a block, and wait for a number of
blocks thereafter before it trusts the blockchain. This will
rule out precomputed blocks in a replay attack.
Finally, UTxO shards have to be stored somewhere so
that they are readily available to secure thin nodes that
need them. For that, we propose the use of a DHT which
can be executed on any nodes, although we expect that full
nodes and secure thin nodes will typically be part of it. Full
nodes will further keep a copy of the entire set of shards,
while each secure thin node will keep a small subset.
3. PROPOSED SYSTEM
Our proposed design involves five distinct roles, namely
miners, full nodes, secure thin nodes, legacy thin nodes, and
DHT nodes. Some of these roles can be executed by the same
physical nodes, for instance miners, full nodes, or secure thin
nodes would typically also be part of the DHT.
Note that our proposed design is completely transparent
from the point of view of full nodes and legacy thin nodes,
which will continue to function precisely the way they do.
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Figure 3: The block index hash and the UTxO hash
are added to the block header.
obtain secure thin nodes and the precise operation of our
design, split by roles.
3.1 Data structures
We introduce two data structures to guarantee the in-
tegrity of our design against malicious nodes. The first con-
cerns the integrity of UTxO shards, while the second guar-
antees the integrity of blocks distributed through the DHT.
As explained in Section 2, we partition the UTxO set into
2k shards, where each coin’s placement is determined by
the first k bits of the coin’s hash. To guarantee the shards’
integrity, we define a two-layer set of hashes, as highlighted
in red in Figure 3. The lower level of hashes consists of one
hash per shard, Hi = HASH(Si), ∀i ∈ Z[0,k−1]. The upper
level consists of just one hash of all Hi, that is, HUTxO =
HASH(∪k−1i=0Hi). The hashing function HASH is the one
used in Bitcoin, i.e., HASH(x) = SHA-256(SHA-256(x)),
noted SHA-2562 throughout this document.
The second structure we use concerns the integrity of
blocks of the blockchain. To freely access any section of
the ledger, a secure thin node should be able to retrieve ar-
bitrary blocks from the DHT. A block is indexed in the DHT
by its own hash value. Therefore, we maintain an array of
all blocks’ hashes, which we call the index. This array is
hashed each time a new block is created to obtain a hash of
the index, Hindex, highlighted in green in Figure 3.
Both 32-byte hashes, HUTxO and Hindex, are placed in
block headers. The blockchain acts as an alteration-proof
communication channel, ensuring in effect the broadcast of
the correct values of HUTxO and Hindex, every time a new
block is created.
3.2 Miners
Miners constitute the core of the Bitcoin network. They
try to solve the proof-of-work computational puzzle in order
to create new blocks, and profit from the monetary com-
pensation associated with it. More specifically, they receive
from wallet nodes (i.e., full or legacy/secure thin nodes)
announcements about new transactions that should be in-
cluded in future blocks. Each miner picks an arbitrary set of
pending transactions, typically the maximum number that
can fit in one block with a preference for transactions offer-
ing a higher mining fee, and generates the SHA-2562 hash
of the block for billions of arbitrary 32-byte values in the
nonce field. A miner stops generating hashes once one of
them happens to be below a predetermined value, known as
the mining difficulty level. At this point, a new block has
been created, and the miner that found it announces it to
the entire set of miners. Each miner receiving a newly cre-
ated block validates the block’s integrity. That is, it makes
sure that (i) the block’s SHA-2562 is indeed lower than the
difficulty threshold, (ii) all transactions in it are legitimate
(i.e., if all input coins are in the UTxO set and are signed by
their claimed owners), and that (iii) the miner that created
it has allocated the correct amount to his own wallet (i.e.,
the number of bitcoins offered per created block, plus the
fees of all included transactions). If the block is valid and
extends the blockchain, the miner starts working on creating
the next block to be linked to the newly received block.
In the context of our proposed design, miners should also
include two 32-byte fields in each block header: the HUTxO
and Hindex hashes defined in Section 3.1.
Note that Hindex cannot include the hash of the current
block, as this would imply a circular dependency between
the two. Therefore, Hindex contains the hash of the index
including all blocks up to and including the previous one.
Similarly, HUTxO refers to the UTxO set of the previous
block. That is, the UTxO set right before any transactions of
the current block have been applied. The reason for this has
to do with performance. If the current block’s transactions
had to be included in the HUTxO, as miners keep receiving
new transactions while trying to mine the next block, they
would have to internally keep track of updates to the UTxO
set, its shards, its shards’ hashes, and the hashes’ aggregate
hash each time a new transaction is received. This would
add an unnecessary burden to the mining process. Instead,
including the previous block’s HUTxO, which is a fixed hash
computed once, has negligible computational implications
for the mining process. Additionally, it also benefits nodes
when they receive new blocks. They can instantly verify
the HUTxO present in the block, without having to take into
account the transactions included in the block.
Finally, in addition to disseminating a block that has been
newly created, miners should now also upload the block, and
the respective UTxO shards to the DHT.
3.3 Secure thin nodes
A user willing to verify an incoming payment may now
use a secure thin node in her smartphone, instead of the less
secured SPV client. Upgrading to a secure thin node enables
a user to verify the validity of transactions contained in a
block by querying the UTxO set built by other nodes and
stored in the DHT. More details on the security aspect of our
proposal on secure thin nodes can be found in Section 4.1.
When a secure thin node joins the system, it bootstraps
by downloading from another node: (i) the last few blocks
(e.g., 6), (ii) the list of UTxO shard hashes, and (iii) the list
of block hashes.
The last few blocks are used to resolve blockchain forks as
well as to extract HUTxO and Hindex. These hashes are used
to verify the integrity of the data retrieved from the DHT.
The list of UTxO shard hashes is used to securely ver-
ify transactions contained in newly mined blocks. Once re-
trieved, the list is hashed and compared with the HUTxO
present in the latest received block. To verify a transaction,
a secure thin node identifies its inputs, finds which UTxO
shard each input should belong to, and queries the DHT
for the shards it needs. It then ensures the validity of each
shard by comparing its hash against the one it downloaded
before. If an input is indeed in the shard, it is valid.
The list of block hashes is used to query the DHT for
blocks for historical purposes. Full nodes verify the whole
blockchain as part of their bootstrap, which enables them
to know for sure which blocks are part of the blockchain.
Secure thin nodes avoid this long process, and therefore
need another way to determine which blocks compose the
blockchain. In our system, we make the list of block hashes
downloadable and verifiable. Once received, this list is hashed
and compared against the Hindex hash contained in the lat-
est block. A correct match indicates that this list has been
agreed upon by a consensus of miners and is thus deemed
valid by a secure thin node.
Finally, when a secure thin node receives a new block, it
can verify its headers as well as the transactions whose in-
puts belong to the UTxO shards it possesses. Missing shards
can be queried to verify other transaction inputs. Addition-
ally, secure thin nodes can locally update their UTxO shards
by applying to them each relevant transaction inputs and
outputs from the newly received block.
3.4 DHT nodes
To handle the need for secure thin nodes to retrieve arbi-
trary shards, we propose to federate the storage space of a
large number of nodes by using a DHT to collectively store
and provide shards. Note that, in principle, DHT nodes can
be Bitcoin agnostic; even nodes without any Bitcoin-related
role can be part of the DHT.
As secure thin nodes may need to access past blocks’
shards, the DHT should maintain a shard history of at least
the h most recent blocks. In order to index all these shards,
DHT indexes should be a combination of the relevant block’s
hash, and the shard index (0. . . k − 1) within that block’s
UTxO set. Such an index can be provided by HASH (Hblock∪
i), where Hblock is the relevant block’s hash and i is the spe-
cific shard’s index.
In addition to shards, the DHT should also help in retriev-
ing arbitrary blocks of the blockchain, which will otherwise
become a bottleneck as the blockchain keeps growing. There
is no need for a separate DHT. Instead, blocks can be stored
in the same DHT, indexed by their block hash.
Clearly, our DHT key space is [0, 2256−1], accepting SHA-
256 hashes as keys. The selection of the specific DHT, how-
ever, is not relevant for the correct operation of our system,
as the 〈key → value〉 mapping is a standard functionality
for all DHTs. The only differentiating points are the ability
of DHT nodes to arbitrarily pick their contributed storage,
and the ability of the DHT to cater for a sufficient level of
replication, but these are implementation design decisions
that are beyond the scope of this paper.
4. PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS
Our secure thin nodes offer a trade-off between existing
full nodes and Simplified Payment Verification (SPV) clients
(legacy thin nodes), both in terms of security model and in
terms of storage and bandwidth consumption.
4.1 Security model of secure thin nodes
Secure thin nodes offer a security model that approaches
that of full nodes while being significantly stronger than that
of legacy SPV clients.
Full nodes verify every operation. When a full node boot-
straps, it downloads and verifies the entire chain, while build-
ing its own UTxO set. This enables full nodes to operate
without having to trust any other node. An SPV client,
on the other hand, must connect to a full node, which will
forward only the blocks that contain the transactions that
directly concern the client. This limited information makes
it impossible for SPV clients to detect fraudulent blocks and
transactions and forces them to rely entirely on their associ-
ated full node. A malicious full node could easily trick SPV
clients simply by omitting to forward blocks, or by forging
blocks with fraudulent transactions.
Secure thin nodes strike a balance between these two ex-
tremes by verifying only a portion of the blockchain instead
of all of it. Secure thin nodes start the verification at some
arbitrary block, and they continue verifying blocks there-
after. After having verified a number of blocks generated
with the correct difficulty and correct timestamp , they can
be practically certain that they are following the legitimate
chain, as it would have been computationally close to im-
possible for a set of malicious nodes to produce blocks of
such difficulty. Thus, they get hold of the HUTxO, which en-
ables them to verify the specific shards they need, to validate
transactions when receiving payments. This grants them a
trust level close to that of full nodes.
However, secure thin nodes generally validate the hashes
of new blocks, and only a subset of the included transactions
(those that are directly relevant to them). Thus, in a well
orchestrated attack a secure thin node T could be presented
with a fake block that contains a valid transaction paying
money to T , but that deliberately also contains an invalid
transaction to some irrelevant node. The invalid transaction
is there just to make sure this block will never actually make
it to the legitimate blockchain, so if T trusts this transaction
it may become a victim. Secure thin nodes can detect this
attack by validating all the transactions in the block. This
is possible but expensive in terms of shard downloads. Se-
cure thin nodes should therefore adapt their validation cost
depending on the importance of their transactions. For mi-
nor transactions, they can simply verify their own entries,
but for big ones they may wish to verify all the transactions
in the block. This flexibility makes secure thin nodes much
more secure than legacy SPV clients.
4.2 Performance analysis
Even though a thorough performance analysis is out of
the scope of this paper, in the following, we briefly discuss
the storage, bandwidth, and computation requirements of
secure thin nodes, and the overhead that these impose on
existing full nodes.
We consider a sharding policy that splits the UTxO set in
2k shards by looking at the first k bits of a coin hash. For our
example, we assume k = 14, resulting into 16384 shards of
89 KiB each, considering that the UTxO set weights 1.39 GiB.
4.2.1 Secure thin nodes
Storage Secure thin nodes need to keep at least the last
few blocks to resolve branches (6 MiB for 6 blocks), the list
of block hashes (427000×32 ≈ 13 MiB) and the list of UTxO
shard hashes (16384 × 32 = 512 KiB). In total, secure thin
nodes need to store at least 20 MiB. If they participate in
the DHT, they additionally need to store the shards they are
responsible for. To this end, they can dedicate an additional
25 MiB which enables each of them to store the two latest
versions (h = 2) of at least 140 shards. In reality, nodes can
easily save space by storing multiple versions as differences.
Finally, secure thin nodes need to temporarily store shards
that they download from the DHT but that they are not
responsible for. To this end they can allocate a small cache
(e.g., 2 MiB) as described in Section 3.3. This results in an
overall storage requirement of about 47 MiB, about thirty
times less than the size of the entire UTxO set.
Bandwidth When joining the network, a secure thin
node initially downloads the aforementioned 45 MiB to fill
its data structures and to initialize its local DHT storage.
Next, for each new block, it needs to update its list of UTxO
shard hashes by downloading it from full nodes, which cor-
responds to 512 KiB every 10 minutes. Finally, the secure
thin node downloads actual shards from the DHT whenever
it encounters a transaction that it wants to verify for a shard
that it does not currently own. Clearly, secure thin nodes
face a trade off between the number of shards they store
locally either as part of the DHT or in their local cache,
and the number of shards they download from other DHT
nodes. A node that only wishes to verify its own trans-
actions can minimize its storage requirements and rely on
the DHT as much as possible. Conversely one that wishes
to verify most transactions should dedicate more storage to
have more shards readily available.
Computation When receiving a block, a secure thin node
verifies the transactions relevant to its interest. Addition-
ally, it updates the block index hash, it updates the shards
it maintains based on the content of the block, and uses the
updated shards to update the UTxO hash.
4.2.2 Full nodes
Storage Full nodes incur limited storage overhead. In
addition to storing the entire UTxO set as in the standard
Bitcoin protocol, they only need to store the list of UTxO
shard hashes (512 KiB with 214 shards). If they are part
of the DHT, they also dedicate a few MiB of additional
storage to store multiple versions of the UTxO shards they
are responsible for. These can easily be stored in diff format
to limit the storage requirements.
Bandwidth Full nodes that participate in the DHT incur
some bandwidth overhead to honor requests of secure thin
nodes, and only negligible overhead due to the additional
fields in each block.
Computation Like secure thin nodes, full nodes only
need to perform a few additional operations to update the
block index hash, and the UTxO hash. But their cost is
negligible when compared to that of block mining.
4.2.3 DHT resilience
We conclude this preliminary analysis by studying how the
amount of storage dedicated to the DHT affects its resilience
to node disconnections. Let us consider a scenario in which
the DHT consists of 1000 secure thin nodes each dedicating
25 MiB to the DHT. As discussed above, this allows each
node to store two versions of at least 140 shards. Considering
a total of 16384 shards, this yields a replication factor of 8
for very minimal storage and bandwidth requirements.
5. RELATEDWORK
Making the UTxO set available for queries between nodes
has been proposed and discussed several times in the Bitcoin
community over the past few years. Several authors have
proposed to commit the UTxO set in blocks to enable faster
node bootstrap [9, 13] or to also strengthen the security
model of thin nodes [4, 7, 8, 10, 12, 14]; we will focus on the
most advanced of these proposals.
Andrew Miller suggests [10] storing the UTxO set as leaves
of a balanced Merkle tree and committing its root hash in
the blockchain. Thin nodes do not need to store the tree,
they can query it if it is stored by full nodes or on an ex-
ternal storage. To verify that a Transaction Output (TxO)
is present in the UTxO set, a thin node starts from the leaf
containing the TxO and recomputes each of it parent’s hash
up to the root hash. The computed root hash should match
the one present in the latest block. To recompute the root
hash, thin nodes only need to query for log(n) tree nodes,
one for each of the TxO’s parent in the tree.
This solution is ideal for thin nodes, as they require min-
imum computation and minimum storage to verify trans-
actions. However, full nodes need to store the entire tree,
not only the leaves representing the UTxO set, which makes
them much heavier. In our proposal, full nodes only pay a
small additional storage cost.
Peter Todd has a more radical approach [15] in mind when
it comes to dealing with the growth of the UTxO. The TxO
set, both spent and unspent, is stored in insertion ordered
Merkle trees (named Merkle Mountain Range, MMR, by
the author) which can easily be pruned and restored when
needed. Pruning the MMR enables a lower storage require-
ment, and can be done when a subtree of the MMR is com-
mitted in the blockchain. The restoration of a subtree is
needed when a transaction spends an old TxO present in
a pruned subtree. In such a case, the transaction must be
accompanied with a proof that the TxO is present in the
MMR, such as the list of the TxO parents in the tree. This
proof can be stored by the owners of the spendable coins,
rather than by the verifying nodes. At the extreme, no node
needs to keep the UTxO set if all the transactions include a
proof of validity
Peter Todd’s proposal imposes a profound change to the
Bitcoin protocol by adding proofs of validity to the transac-
tions themselves, thus shrinking the storage requirements,
but drastically increasing the bandwidth consumption.
The scalability of Bitcoin has been a growing concern as
adoption kept increasing. In this section, we have presented
several proposals that deal with storage scalability, but more
scalability challenges have been identified in the literature [1,
2, 3]. In particular, Bitcoin-NG [6] focuses on the through-
put scalability and reach a near optimal number of transac-
tion per second.
6. CONCLUSIONS
We have presented an adaptive distributed storage solu-
tion for Bitcoin that improves the security model of thin
nodes, such as mobile devices, by enabling them to locally
verify transactions in blocks as they are being created. Our
secure thin nodes can verify transactions by querying a DHT
for shards of the set of unspent transaction outputs (UTxO)
as well as for blocks when searching in the blockchain history.
Secure thin nodes can define the maximum storage space
they wish to allocate for Bitcoin, inducing a user-defined
trade-off between storage requirement and bandwidth con-
sumption.
For the future, we plan to evaluate our solution, as well
as further tuning the UTxO sharding policy to reduce the
number of UTxO shards needed to verify a block.
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